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Mobility in the Mangroves: Catch Rates, Daily Decisions, and Dynamics of 
Artisanal Fishing in a Coastal Commons 
Abstract 
This paper integrates institutional theories of the commons with insights from geography 
and human behavioral ecology to explore the spatial and temporal dynamics of artisanal 
fishing in Ecuador’s coastal mangrove swamps. The focus is on the cockle fishery 
commons characterized by a mixture of formal institutional arrangements and an 
informal division of fishing space that partially influences fisher decisions about where 
and when to fish. Individual decisions are further explained to a certain degree by the 
patch choice model since fishers often move on to new grounds when their catch rates 
fall below average. These optimizing strategies requiring rotation within a socially 
produced fishing space may contribute to resource renewal, perceived reliable returns for 
individuals, and a relative stability in fishing effort, potentially mitigating against 
resource depletion in open-access areas not managed as a common property regime. This 
study of the interaction between shellfish harvesters, cultural institutions, and the 
environment contributes to a spatially explicit theory of the commons and points to the 
crucial role of resource user mobility and cultural institutions for the ecological 
sustainability of shellfish fisheries. A better understanding of feedback between 
individual decision-making and the self-organization of a social-ecological system has 
critical implications for policy design and fisheries management at similar scales.   
 
Keywords: artisanal fisheries; decision making; common pool resource theory; optimal 
foraging theory; fisheries management; Ecuador 
 
Resumen 
En este trabajo se integra las teorías institucionales de los bienes comunes con los puntos 
de vista de la geografía y la ecología humana para explorar la dinámica espacial y 
temporal de la pesca artesanal en los manglares de Ecuador. La atención se centra en la 
pesquería de concha prieta caracterizada por arreglos institucionales formales y una 
división informal de espacio de pesca que influye parcialmente las decisiones de los 
mariscadores acerca de dónde y cuándo pescar. Las decisiones individuales se explican 
más detalladamente en cierta medida por el modelo de elección parche ya que los 
pescadores suelen trasladarse a nuevos terrenos cuando sus tasas de captura están por 
debajo de la media. Las estrategias de optimizar requiriendo rotación dentro de un 
espacio social pueden permitir la renovación del recurso, capturas fiables para los 
pescadores, y una estabilidad relativa en el esfuerzo  pesquero, lo que podría mitigar 
contra el agotamiento de los recursos en las zonas de libre acceso no gestionados como 
un régimen de propiedad común. Este estudio de la interacción entre los mariscadores y 
su medio ambiente contribuye a una teoría de los bienes comunes espacialmente explícito 
y señala el papel crucial de la movilidad de los usuarios y las instituciones culturales para 
la sostenibilidad ecológica en la pesquería. Un mejor entendimiento sobre la interacción 
entre las decisiones y la auto-organización de un sistema socio-ecológico tiene 
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implicaciones importantes para el diseño de políticas y la gestión de pesquerías en escalas 
similares. 
 
Palabras claves: pesquerías artesanales; toma de decisiones; teoría de los bienes comunes; 
manejo de recursos; Ecuador 
 
Highlights:  
 A spatially explicit theory of the commons considers resource user mobility. 
 Spatial and temporal dynamics of fishing effort emerge from individual decisions. 
 Cultural institutions and previous-day catch rates influence fishers’ decisions.  
 Fishers alternate between formal and informal systems of governance.  
 Formal and informal governance systems are complementary and adaptive. 
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Mobility in the Mangroves: Catch Rates, Daily Decisions, and Dynamics of 
Artisanal Fishing in a Coastal Commons 
 
1. Introduction 
As a classic example of common pool resources, fisheries face many management 
challenges due to the difficulty of excluding individuals whose harvesting efforts are 
costly for a larger population of resource users who compete for the same resource space 
(Berkes, 2001; Berkes, 2005; Feeny, Berkes, McCay, & Acheson, 1990; Gordon, 1954). 
For geographers, the tragedy of the commons emerges out of mismatched scales in the 
interaction between the spatial domains of resources and resource users, in which self-
interested actions result in resource depletion (Campbell, 2007; Giordano, 2003). 
Overcoming a mismatch between management and ecosystem scales requires a better 
understanding of the spatial organization and complex interactions between human and 
natural systems at finer scales (Johnson, Wilson, Cleaver, & Vadas, 2012; Wilson, 2006).  
Over the last several decades, commons theory has advanced understanding about 
the importance of property rights institutions, which are often held as an essential 
mechanism for maintaining or improving resource systems (Agrawal, 2001; Basurto, 
2005; Basurto et al., 2012; Bromley & Feeny, 1992; Hanna, Folke, & Mäler, 1996; 
Hanna & Munasinghe, 1995; McCay & Acheson, 1987; Schlager & Ostrom, 1999). 
Similarly, customary marine tenure institutions have also been exalted in the literature as 
social systems that effectively manage resources through controlled access and regulated 
use (Colding & Folke, 2001; Dyer & McGoodwin, 1994; Johannes, 1978, 2002) 
notwithstanding some skepticism about the assumed conservation ethics embedded 
within those institutions (Lu, 2001; Pollnac & Johnson, 2005; Ruttan, 1998; Thomas, 
2001). Despite numerous theoretical advances about the crucial role of formal and 
informal institutions in environmental governance, the commons literature has given less 
explicit attention to how spatial-temporal dynamics of the commons are produced 
socially, politically and materially by various forms of human agency (Moss, 2014) and 
how system-level patterns can emerge out of the self-interested behaviors of individuals 
as a “precursor of governance” (Wilson, Yan, & Wilson, 2007). These questions are 
especially critical considering that research on the spatial dimensions of fishing behavior 
is of burgeoning interest in the fisheries science and management literature (Abernethy, 
Allison, Molloy, & Côté, 2007; Daw, 2008; Salas & Gaertner, 2004; Teh, Teh, & 
Meitner, 2012). 
This paper explores dynamic spatial and temporal patterns in the fishing effort on 
a micro-scale, focusing on fisher decisions and the role of resource user mobility over 
fishing space in Ecuador’s fishery for mangrove cockles (Anadara tuberculosa and A. 
similis). Mangrove cockles are bivalve mollusks harvested from the roots of mangrove 
trees during low tide periods by artisanal fishers throughout their range from Mexico to 
Peru (MacKenzie, 2001). I integrate institutional common pool resource theory (CPR) 
with optimal foraging theory (OFT) for its explicit attention to the human-environment 
interface to explore how fishers navigate over patchy ecological conditions and under 
different governance systems. OFT has traditionally been used in anthropology to study 
how foragers make decisions about resources to best enhance their fitness in a Darwinian 
sense (Kelly, 1995). However, some OFT models offer appropriate methodological tools 
to explore how resource users respond to ecological dynamics (Chimello de Oliveira & 
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Begossi, 2011; Sosis, 2002). As such, theories in human behavioral ecology have been 
increasingly applied to address practical issues in conservation, development, and 
resource management (Aswani, 1998; Aswani, 1998; Chimello de Oliveira & Begossi, 
2011; Heinen, 1995, 1996; Heinen & Low, 1992; Tucker, 2007; Tucker & Rende Taylor, 
2007) and are compatible with rational choice theories and classical economic 
assumptions about human behavior in the fisheries literature (Acheson, 2011; Béné & 
Tewfik, 2001; Hilborn, 2007).  
 Using catch-per-unit-effort (CPUE) data collected over four months in Isla Costa 
Rica, Ecuador, the scope of this paper is confined to three specific questions. First, how 
do catch rates of a previous day influence a fisher’s decision about where to fish and 
when to move on? Second, how does the cultural and institutional context shape broader 
spatial patterns of mobility over fishing space? Finally, what are the management 
implications of this fine-scale analysis of the spatial-temporal dimensions of fishing 
effort? The activity of harvesting shells represents the human-environment interface 
where artisanal fishers interact with their biophysical environment and their cultural-
institutional context.  
This case study of cockle fishing in Isla Costa Rica offers a unique opportunity to 
observe how changing social constructions of the commons influence dynamics of 
artisanal fishing and how fishers’ alternate between two kinds of governance systems: 1) 
open-access fishing grounds with an informal division of fishing space and 2) fishing 
grounds formally managed as a common property regime. Ecuador’s cockle fishery has 
experienced harvesting pressures in the last 10 years (Mora & Moreno, 2009; Mora, 
Moreno, & Jurado, 2011), further exacerbated by habitat destruction due to decades of 
mangrove deforestation associated with shrimp aquaculture (MacKenzie, 2001; Ocampo-
Thomason, 2006). Shifts from top-down to bottom-up approaches in coastal management 
during the late 1990s signaled an unprecedented recognition of ancestral rights for coastal 
inhabitants, resulting in new property arrangements called custodias. The custodias 
represent agreements between Ecuador’s Ministry of Environment and local associations, 
which aim to protect mangrove forests and provide a framework for community-based 
management of mangrove-associated artisanal fisheries. To date, there are 51 custodias 
distributed throughout the five coastal provinces (Mestanza, 2014). The arrangement is 
similar to co-management institutions in other parts of Latin America (Gallardo 
Fernandez & Friman, 2011; Gelcich, Edwards-Jones, Kaiser, & Castilla, 2006; Pinto da 
Silva, 2004; Van Holt, 2012).  
The local association in Isla Costa Rica was one of the first in the southern 
province of El Oro to receive a custodia. Their management plan specifies closure 
periods, rules of use and access to a particular set of specially managed cockle beds 
within the custodia boundaries (Bravo & Altamirano, 2006) similar to Ostrom’s design 
principles of a common property regime (Beitl, 2011; Ostrom, 1990). Other cockle beds 
within the custodia are harvested daily, operating on a first-come, first served basis. 
These open-access areas within the custodia and beyond its boundaries are informally 
divided among individuals based on personal preferences, habitual use, and mutual 
respect (Beitl, 2014). The following sections will explore the complementary nature of 
these two systems at a local scale illustrating the ways in which common pool resource 
theory and human behavioral ecology are well-positioned to contribute to a spatially 
explicit theory of the commons with critical implications for fisheries management.  
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2. Spatializing Commons Theory 
 
2.1 Theoretical Framework 
Common pool resource (CPR) theory has typically classified social-ecological 
systems into a typology of property regimes including public, private, common property, 
and open-access (Feeny et al., 1990; Ostrom, Burger, Field, Norgaard, & Policansky, 
1999). Giordano’s (2003) spatially-explicit theory of the commons is based on a typology 
of resource characteristics along the lines of fugitive, migratory, and open-access, which 
reflects variations in geography to better understand the interaction between the spatial 
domains of the resource base and its users. Moss (2014) points out that spatial concepts 
like space, place, territory, and scale have been treated more as a fixed means of 
categorization in the commons literature rather than an object of analysis in and of itself. 
Moss further highlights the essentializing tendencies of the institutional literature on the 
commons, which has narrowly conceived of space as a static biophysical realm, thereby 
failing to appreciate the dynamic human-environment interactions, cultural-political 
dimensions, various forms of agency, and alternative geographies that shape the 
production, use, and regulation of the commons (Moss, 2014). Combining ethnographic 
research on the fishery commons with human behavioral ecology has the potential to 
address some of these deficiencies in commons theory since spatial and temporal patterns 
in harvesting behavior represent a dynamic human-environment interface.  
From a human behavioral ecology perspective, cockles are sessile and predictable 
like other shellfish, making them susceptible to overexploitation (Thomas, 2007a). This is 
especially true in open-access situations where the domains of multiple users overlap 
because of poorly defined property rights (Giordano, 2003) and low communication 
levels among resource users (Janssen & Ostrom, 2008). On the other hand, from the 
perspective of CPR theory, it is because of the sedentary nature of shellfish that resource 
users may find it easier to devise institutions and invest in a management strategy, as in 
the case of Maine’s soft shell clam fishery (Hanna, 1998) and other benthic fisheries 
(Basurto et al., 2012). The relatively stationary characteristics of lobsters may have also 
contributed to the widely documented emergence of a governance system in Maine’s 
lobster fishery characterized by an informal system of territoriality among “lobster 
gangs,” and a more formal system of co-management (Acheson, 1988; Acheson, 2003; 
Acheson & Gardner, 2004; Wilson et al., 2007). Wilson and colleagues have argued that 
such forms of collective action have emerged out of the self-interested behavior of 
competing fishers (Wilson et al., 2013; Wilson et al., 2007; Wilson, Acheson, & Johnson, 
2013). 
Different OFT models have allowed researchers to test predictions about what 
kinds of strategies allow foragers to optimize their harvesting efficiency. For example, 
the prey choice model predicts which species should be targeted for optimal caloric 
profitability (Thomas, 2007a). The patch choice model tests whether resource users will 
abandon patches when the returns fall below their expected return rates, or mean 
profitability for all patches in the environment (Charnov, 1976; Chimello de Oliveira & 
Begossi, 2011; Sosis, 2002). Sosis (2002) has adapted the patch-choice model to explore 
daily variation in fishing effort among Ifaluk fishers for bluefin tuna. His results show 
that fishers switch to alternative patches (fishing grounds) when catch rates drop below 
the per capita mean of the average catch rate for all patches. He argues these daily 
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variations in catch rates are one possible explanation for why fishers do not consistently 
exploit the most profitable patches all of the time, a nuance which is often obscured by 
the aggregated averages in other patch choice studies. Chimello de Oliveira and Begossi 
(2011) used a similar approach to study patch choices among small-scale shrimp fishers 
in Brazil and also found that fishers moved on when the return rate of the previous trip 
dropped below average.  
Patch-choice models allow for a spatially explicit analysis of the dynamic 
movement of resource users over a patchy environment. This application of the patch-
choice model adds to a large body of research that uses ecological concepts to gain better 
understanding of human-environment interactions that promote (or work against) 
conservation with implications for resource management like niche partitioning (Nunes, 
Hartz, & Silvano, 2011) or territoriality (Acheson, 1987; Begossi, 1995; Begossi, 2001; 
Begossi, 2006).  
 
2.2 Hypotheses 
Optimal foraging models contain several assumptions, but the two assumptions 
most relevant to this research are: 1) that fishers have perfect information about the 
“quality” of fishing grounds and 2) the availability of resources within those fishing 
grounds will decline with accelerating gains, similar to the subtractability problem in the 
commons literature. While fishers do not have perfect information about the 
environment, it is relatively safe to assume that fishers in Isla Costa Rica have a 
specialized understanding about their preferred fishing grounds, which developed out of 
habitual use (Beitl, 2014). Based on these two assumptions, this study tests the following 
hypotheses: 
 
H1: Cockle collectors switch fishing grounds when their catch rate drops below the 
average gross return rate for all the fishing grounds in the environment. 
 
H2: Patterns of fisher mobility are further influenced by the cultural and institutional 
context. 
 
 Given the limitations of optimal foraging models, I do not rely on the sole use of 
the patch choice model to explain the observed patterns in fishing effort. I also draw upon 
21 months of ethnographic research on Ecuador’s cockle fishery to aid my interpretation 
of model results and substantiate the implications for management.  
 
3. Material and Methods  
 
3.1 Description of Study Area 
The Archipelago Jambelí in Ecuador’s southern province of El Oro is a landscape 
mosaic comprised of mangrove forests, shrimp farms, custodias, and urban areas. The 
main study area for this research is the village of Isla Costa Rica, a rural parish with 
around 300 inhabitants located about 8.6 km from Puerto Hualtaco and the city of 
Huaquillas on the Peruvian border. The climate is dry and tropical with an average 
temperature of 25.4°C. The annual precipitation is about 300mm with the highest 
amounts of rainfall from December to May.  
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Similar to the other rural fishing villages throughout the Archipelago Jambelí, the 
residents of Isla Costa Rica rely primarily on mangrove-associated artisanal fisheries for 
a living. Residents harvest mangrove resources for subsistence and commercial markets, 
including mangrove cockles and crabs, shrimp, beach clams, and a variety of finfish 
species. Some households grow subsistence crops in home gardens, predominantly 
watermelon, aloe vera, lemongrass, and passion fruit. Women and girls engage primarily 
in domestic tasks while men and boys fish and collect cockles. There is one primary 
school and since the year 2010, additional teachers from urban centers spend four days of 
the week on the island to offer secondary school-level education, meaning that migration 
to urban areas has no longer been a requirement in the past few years for those residents 
who wish to continue their education. Almost half of the island’s 70 households have one 
or more individuals who collect cockles on a full time basis, defined as 2-4 hours per day, 
5-6 days per week. The other half engage primarily in other fishing activities and part-
time cockle collecting.  
As described briefly in the introduction, the cockle fishery in Isla Costa Rica is 
characterized as a mixed management system because of the custodia. The boundaries of 
the custodia do not encompass all the fishing grounds utilized by cockle collectors in Isla 
Costa Rica, and not all the fishing grounds within the custodia are managed as a common 
property regime with special rules regulating use and access (see Figure 1). Smaller 
circles represent fishing grounds that are harvested daily and generally function as open-
access (OA) in the sense that neither territorial defense nor the exclusion of outsiders is 
enforced. Larger circles represent the areas managed as a common property resource 
regime (CPR). The rules governing the CPR areas were designed and mutually agreed 
upon by members of the association. The rules include 10 harvest days after 30-day 
closure periods, restrictions on shell size permissible for market (45mm in length, in line 
with central government regulations), and a rotating guard duty by each member to to 
prevent entry by outsiders. The rules of access have changed over time as the association 
experimented with different management strategies that best supported social, ecological, 
and economic needs of the community. For example, areas that were once harvested after 
3-6 month closure periods are now only closed for 30 days. But the obligations of 
membership have remained consistent as each member of the association has been 
required to serve guard duty. Those who fail to fulfill this obligation are sanctioned.  
Zones represent a geographical clustering of fishing grounds based on physical 
features such as waterways and cultural features like the names of areas designated by 
members of the community (see Figure 1). For example, Zone 1 is locally referred to as 
“San Gregorio.” Zone 2 is “aquí atrás.” Zone 3 is “Sector Corazones.” Locals refer to the 
fishing grounds managed as common property as “las areas,” which lie somewhere 
between the boundaries of Zones 1 and 2. The cultural features of these zones were 
further elaborated in a previous study of the fishing effort in Isla Costa Rica, which 
revealed an informal division of fishing space based on personal preferences, habitual 
use, and mutual respect among individual cockle collectors from the community and 
beyond (see Beitl, 2014, for a more in-depth ethnographic description of the fishery). 
Grouping fishing grounds into these four zones was necessary in this study to further 
discern patterns of mobility and explore how fishers navigate over fishing space under 
formal and informal governance systems in Isla Costa Rica.   
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Figure 1. Map of the study area Isla Costa Rica. The map illustrates: 1) the area in custodia; 2) “daily 
sites,” or the locations of fishing grounds harvested daily; 3) fishing grounds harvested monthly and 
managed as a common property regime (larger circles); and 4) the informal division of fishing space into 
three zones. Map compiled by author. Data Sources: Asociación Isla Costa Rica (2010); PMRC-CLIRSEN 
(2006); Bravo & Altamirano (2006). 
 
3.2. Methods of Data Collection 
This research is part of a larger ethnographic study of Ecuador’s cockle fishery 
based on 21 months of multi-sited fieldwork from 2006 to 2010. The observational data 
presented here was collected over a period of 115 continuous days from March 8 to June 
30, 2010. There were 27 individuals who agreed to report their daily catch, the number of 
hours fished, the name of fishing grounds, and their alternative activity if they did not go 
cockle collecting (Asociación de Mariscadores Pescadores Artesanales y Afines "Costa 
Rica", 2010). The sample of 27 included 20 members from the Asociación Costa Rica 
and one member from the community’s other association. The remaining six participants 
were their sons under the age of 18 and therefore not eligible for association membership. 
This sample represents almost half of the community’s estimated 70 part-time and full-
time cockle collectors. One field assistant collected the information from those 27 
participants on a daily basis. The field assistant also documented additional fishers to 
calculate the total fishing effort for the day, as well as the number of outsiders and 
general locations where they were observed.  
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3.3 Methods of data analysis 
CPUE in the cockle fishery is defined by Ecuador’s National Fisheries Research 
Institute as the total number of shells per unit of effort where each individual fisher 
represents one unit of effort, and total effort refers to the total number of cockle collectors 
on a given day (Mora et al., 2011). CPUE is a common fishery-dependent statistic used in 
fisheries science to estimate the stock of a given species (NOAA, n.d.). This is similar to 
the concept of return rate in the behavioral ecology literature that usually divides the total 
catch by the total time invested. A simple expression of this concept can be represented 
by the following equation: 
 
R = CPUE/ T where R is the return rate; CPUE is the total number of shells harvested by 
an individual on a trip; and T is the number of hours that individual spent fishing.  
 
 This formula was used to calculate the return rate for each fishing trip observation 
in the dataset (n=1,544) and a threshold average of 26.33 shells harvested per hour for all 
the fishing grounds in Isla Costa Rica.1   
 To further prepare the data for analysis, each observation was coded as a CPR day 
when the specially managed areas were open for harvest and an OA day when they were 
closed. I used Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) to compare differences between the two 
governance systems (OA vs. CPR). Then to test the first hypothesis (whether fishers 
move on or stay put when return rates of a previous fishing trip fall below the mean), a 
set of variables were coded as dichotomous dummy variables. For example, if the return 
rate for an individual dropped below the average return rate for all areas, the observation 
was coded 1 for “yes” and 0 for “no.” The same coding technique was used to classify 
whether the return rate was above or below the mean by fishing ground, by zone, and by 
individual fisher, and whether the fisher switched fishing grounds or zones in response to 
a drop in return rates below the average. I employed a cross-tabulation and chi-squared 
analysis to calculate likelihood ratios and test the relationship between return rates and 
the decision to move on. The Pearson’s chi-square is appropriate to test the likelihood 
that two categorical variables occur together (with four possible outcomes). A Fisher’s 
exact test was used to test for statistical significance. All statistical analyses were 
conducted using SPSS Version 22. I further drew upon the ethnographic research on the 
cockle fishery and Isla Costa Rica to interpret the results.  
 
4. Results  
 Out of 3,103 observations over a period of 115 days, 1,544 fishing trips were 
recorded for the 27 participants who reported information about their daily livelihood 
activities from March 8 to June 30. No one fished on Good Friday (April 2) or during the 
local holiday, Fiesta Patronal (June 12), or any of the 16 Sundays in this dataset. The 
CPR areas were open for the 10-day group harvest on three occasions during the field 
season: 1) March 12-23; 2) April 24-May 5; and 3) June 7-18. Fishing effort increased 
during the second and third CPR harvest periods as many association members chose to 
take advantage of the higher return rates associated with the CPR areas (Figures 2 and 3). 
The average daily catch rates were highly variable and there appeared to be a slight 
                                                 
1 Observations with no data (i.e. 16 Sundays, 2 holidays, and several observations in which certain 
individuals engaged in alternate activities) were dropped from the analyses. 
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increase in effort and decline in catch rates during April and June compared to March, a 
trend that is more pronounced during the CPR periods.  
 
 
 
Figure 2. Fishing effort by people in Isla Costa Rica over time (March 8 – June 30) indicated by the sum of 
fishing trips by the 27 participants in this research plus additional fishers from the community. Reference 
lines group together the 10-day open and 30-day closed periods of the CPR areas.  
 
Figure 3. Average daily CPUE in Isla Costa Rica (March 8-June 30, 2010) self-reported by 27 participants.  
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  There are significant differences in catch rates between areas that operate as open 
access and those managed by the local association as a common property regime. As 
indicated in Table 1, the average CPUE in the CPR areas is 10 shells higher than the OA 
areas and the percentage of trips in which an individual’s catch dropped below the 
average return rate is slightly lower (51% in CPR vs. 57% in OA areas). The same trend 
holds true for when return rates fall below the average return rates by individual. In other 
words, OA areas are associated with a higher likelihood that daily return rates drop below 
the average return rates by each fisher and the threshold average of 26.33 shells per hour 
for all fishing grounds in the community. The table also indicates that fishers move 
around much more within zones than across zones. Moreover, such mobility of fishers is 
higher in OA fishing grounds (73%) compared with CPR grounds (38%). Finally, fishers 
engaged less in alternative livelihood activities on the days that the CPR areas were open 
for harvest (24% of the observations compared with 49% of the observations on OA 
days).  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics comparing differences between management regime types, 
open-access (OA) and common property regime (CPR) (n=1,544). 
 
Variable 
OA CPR 
F-
statistic p-value* 
     
Catch-per-unit-effort (CPUE)  74 84 35.490 0.000* 
Average number of hours spent fishing  2.95 3.02 12.055 0.001* 
Number of shells per hour  25.5 27.8 20.643 0.000* 
     
Whether return rates drop below means     
Returns < mean return for all fishing grounds (26.3) (%)  57 51 5.157 0.025* 
Returns < mean return by fishing ground (%)  55 58 1.266 0.261 
Returns < mean return by zone (%) 55 58 1.620 0.203 
Returns < mean return by fisher (%) 65 54 17.329 0.000* 
     
Whether fishers decide to move on or stay put     
Switch fishing ground (%) 73 38 217.184 0.000* 
Switch zone (%) 44 12 197.890 0.000* 
Likelihood of engaging in an alternate activity (%) 49 24 162.427 0.000* 
 
 Figures 4 and 5 illustrate the dynamic movement of fishers over time by 
summarizing the frequency by which they stay put or move on to a new fishing ground 
under the conditions that their return rate of the previous fishing trip dropped below the 
threshold average of 26.33 shells harvested per hour. Figure 4 suggests that alternating 
among fishing grounds is quite common, regardless of return rates of a previous day. 
However, the likelihood of moving on to a new fishing ground increases with statistical 
significance when return rates of a previous fishing trip dropped below the average. 
Figure 5 indicates that alternating among zones is much less common than alternating 
among sites within a zone. On the other hand, the same pattern holds true that the 
likelihood of zone-switching also increases when return rates of a previous day drop 
below the mean.  
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Figure 4. Frequency that fishers moved on to a new fishing ground after return rates fell below the average 
during the previous fishing trip. X2=8.784; p-value=0.002; n=1,516.  
 
Figure 5. Frequency that fishers moved on to a new zone after return rates fell below the average during the 
previous fishing trip. X2=35.054; p-value=0.000; n=1,510.  
 
 
 
 
 
Mobility in the Mangroves  Beitl 
15 
 
5. Discussion  
 
5.1 Catch rates, decision-making, and fisher mobility 
 Individual decision-making among cockle collectors in Isla Costa Rica is partially 
explained by optimal foraging theory’s patch choice model (Chimello de Oliveira & 
Begossi, 2011; Sosis, 2002; Thomas, 2007b). Even though alternating fishing grounds in 
Isla Costa Rica is common regardless of the return rates of a previous fishing trip, the 
likelihood of moving on appears to increase as a response to diminishing returns. From 
the perspective of human behavioral ecology, this finding suggests that fishers employ 
optimal strategies to seek the most productive fishing grounds and then move on when 
those areas are no longer profitable. These patterns of alternation among fishing grounds 
in response to previous-day catch rates are also similar to the individual search strategy 
described by Wilson and colleagues (2007) as one of the initial stages of fisher behavior 
prior to the formation of groups in their computational model simulating the emergence 
of governance in the Maine lobster fishery.  
On the other hand, fishers may not always be cognizant of when catch rates fall 
below an expected return rate. Changes at small temporal and spatial scales may be too 
marginal for cockle collectors to consciously perceive in ways that inform their daily 
decisions. As such, cockle fishers do not always switch fishing grounds when catch rates 
fall below the average and sometimes switch fishing grounds regardless of the catch rate 
on a previous day. This phenomenon is most likely accounted for by several other 
cultural factors not systematically studied here, such as risk avoidance or travel costs, 
which may be prioritized over any desire to maximize catch rates. Many studies have 
documented non-ecological factors influencing spatial and temporal dimensions of 
fishing behavior, such as perceptions about safety and fuel costs (Daw, 2008; Teh et al., 
2012; Van Oostenbrugge, Densen, & Machiels, 2001), access controls (Basurto, 2005; 
Basurto et al., 2012), engagement in some level of occupational pluralism (Daw et al., 
2012; Griffith & Valdés Pizzini, 2002; McCay, 1978), or other non-economic factors like 
personal obligations or illness (Guest, 2003). Moreover, individuals are differentiated by 
unique harvesting strategies. For example, some fishers alternate frequently within and 
across zones while others have clear preferences and habitually harvest particular zones 
even if they are less productive (Beitl, 2014). A spatially-explicit theory of the commons 
considers such spatial and temporal dimensions in the dynamic social production of 
fishing space, which is discussed in more detail in the following section. 
 
5.2 Dynamic cultural production of the commons and patterns of mobility 
Some geographers emphasize the importance of understanding the ways in which 
the commons are socially constructed to embody certain human values (McDermott, 
2014; Shaw, 2014). These value systems, in turn, serve as an informal institution 
encompassing unspoken rules, norms, or a moral code. The mangrove-fishery commons 
in Ecuador has been characterized by an ethos of open access similar to what Moritz and 
others (2013) have described about West African pastoral systems. Cockle fishers in 
Ecuador generally believe that all fishers should have the right to harvest fish from 
mangroves as long as they do not destroy them. In other words, no one should be 
excluded from coastal wetlands except for shrimp farmers who have bulldozed the 
mangroves away for the construction of their shrimp ponds over the last several decades.  
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Despite the first-come, first-served nature of access in the cockle fishery, fishers 
in Isla Costa Rica habitually harvest their preferred fishing grounds but do not actively 
defend them (Beitl, 2014). This de facto system of preferences allows fishers the freedom 
of movement based on their individualized knowledge, expertise, and judgment, as 
opposed to the more structured collective choice agreements about the rules of rotation 
and harvest that define the CPR managed areas. The informal system operates based on a 
combination of aggregated self-interested preferences (Wilson et al., 2007) within a 
culture of mutual respect and avoidance (McGoodwin, 1994; Moritz et al., 2013; Nunes 
et al., 2011). While the informal division of fishing space can influence human-
environment dynamics, it can best be described as a loosely governed commons 
characterized by flexibility and high levels of mobility among fishing grounds, especially 
in comparison to the explicit rule structure governing access to the CPR areas. 
 Assuming that fishers generally conform to the system of preferences that shape 
the informal division of fishing space in open-access areas, the strategy of alternating 
among fishing grounds permits cockle bed recovery after an exploitation event 
potentially mitigating against depletion. Fishers are able to draw upon their ecological 
and biological knowledge about cockles to allow fishing grounds sufficient time to rest 
before the next harvest period. This local ecological understanding has informed the 
harvest schedule for the set of fishing grounds in Isla Costa Rica managed as a CPR. 
These areas serve as a reserve area for cockle spawning and growth during its closure 
periods. Because of the strict set of rules governing harvest periods, the fishing grounds 
managed as common property are associated with larger shell sizes and higher catch rates 
(see also Beitl, 2011). Thus, from a behavioral ecology perspective, fishers accept the 
short-term costs of vacating the more profitable sites (CPR areas) for less productive 
fishing grounds (OA areas) to allow for resource renewal (Ruttan, 1998; Sosis, 2002; 
Thomas, 2007b). This acceptance of short term costs has allowed conditions that permit 
local investment and collective action in the areas managed as a CPR. Regardless of 
whether cockle collectors are cognizant of when daily catch rates fall below an expected 
return rate, the mobility of individuals under formal and informal institutional 
arrangements may be a critical factor sustaining common pool resources in Isla Costa 
Rica.  
 In the last several decades, this spirit of open access has been threatened by 
multiple challenges such as increasing competition, displacement by shrimp farming, and 
pollution. In many ways, custodias have helped coastal people reclaim their ancestral 
fishing spaces after their livelihoods were undermined by export-oriented growth and 
development of shrimp aquaculture. The custodias have granted new forms of agency 
that have restructured the interactions between artisanal fishers and their resource space 
through community-based resource management. They embody the ways in which 
ideologies of universal access have shifted to an acceptance of several group 
proprietorships. The changing valuation of public goods and ancestral rights has led to 
the emergence of a new rule structure embodied by the common property regime, which 
operates alongside the informal system of individual preferences. Both systems of 
governance are highly complementary and allow for a certain “economics of flexibility” 
(McCay, 1978; McCay, 2002). The CPR areas within custodias promote social, 
ecological, and economic benefits for fishers who have access privileges. They provide 
an ecological reserve for shellfish management and further provide incentives for 
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individuals with access rights to invest in conservation. In turn, the fishing grounds 
outside the formally managed CPR permit an economic safety net for fishers throughout 
the country when alternative livelihood options are limited due to seasonal patterns in 
other fisheries or the country’s larger economic conditions. The mixed property 
arrangements combining CPR and OA suggest interesting possibilities for the 
management of shellfish fisheries at similar scales.    
 
5.3 Epiphenomenal resource management and the issue of scale  
In the fisheries literature, optimizing strategies have been associated with 
overexploitation (Gordon, 1954) and a tragedy of the commons (Hardin, 1968). Some 
researchers have likened the moving on pattern to “roving banditry” or a fishing down 
trend that eventually leads to extirpation (Berkes et al., 2006), especially when 
management solutions are not aligned with ecological realities at appropriate scales 
(Johnson et al., 2012; Wilson, 2006). On the other hand, optimizing strategies requiring 
rotation among multiple fishing grounds in Isla Costa Rica may permit a form of 
unintended resource management or self-organization at the system level, which ensures 
relatively reliable returns for individuals and potentially mitigates against a tragedy in 
open-access areas not managed as common property. Open access systems that operate in 
a similar fashion, in which resource users can enjoy the freedom of movement, do not 
always result in a tragedy of the commons even on larger spatial and temporal scales, as 
documented in West African pastoral systems (Moritz, Hamilton, Chen, & Scholte, 2014; 
Moritz, Scholte, Hamilton, & Kari, 2013). While Figure 3 indicates catch rates are higher 
during March compared to April and June, the scope of this study does not capture 
seasonality in fishing effort or fishery productivity, which has not been systematically 
studied in Ecuador’s cockle fishery. Both biologists and fishers in Ecuador believe that 
cockles spawn in January and February, possibly resulting in higher catch rates around 
that time.  
Epiphenomenal resource management is often possible in small scale societies or 
low population densities even if conservation is not intentional (Begossi, 1995, 2006; Lu, 
2001; Smith & Wishnie, 2000). However, as many geographers have pointed out, the 
problem of the commons largely depends on the spatial, temporal, and technological 
scale at which it is assessed (Campbell, 2007; Giordano, 2003). At this micro-scale of 
cockle fishing in Isla Costa Rica, fishing space is shared among few users with a level of 
fishing effort that is appropriate for the current market demands and available resource 
space. As such, the resource domain is spatially small enough for a fisher to apply his 
local ecological knowledge about cockle biology while also drawing upon the cultural 
knowledge he has about the behavior of other fishers who share the same fishing space. 
In this way, one’s “attachment to place” is not compromised, which lays a solid 
foundation and cultural conditions for collective action or some other form of informal 
resource management (Berkes et al., 2006). Many cockle fishers in Ecuador enjoy the 
freedom of open access and perceive relatively reliable return rates, especially in 
comparison with other mangrove fisheries associated with higher levels of investment in 
fishing gear and uncertainty. For some Ecuadorians, cockle collecting is a primary 
livelihood profession which they practice on a year-round, day-to-day basis. Others fall 
back on cockle fishing as a safety net when economic times are difficult or in congruence 
with seasonal patterns in other fisheries.  
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On the other hand, the open access nature of the cockle fishery in Ecuador may 
allow cumulative effects of declining catch rates due to uncontrolled fishing effort on 
larger spatial and temporal scales. Many cockle fishers are concerned that the fishing 
effort increased during the late 1990s at the end of the shrimp boom that attracted so 
many migrants to the coast during the 1980s. A disease in cultured shrimp forced the 
abandonment of many shrimp farms leaving many skilled and unskilled laborers in 
coastal communities no choice but to enter one of Ecuador’s open-access artisanal 
fisheries. The cockle fishery was the most accessible because of the negligible amounts 
of investment required (rubber boots and gloves are optional). Thus while the 
technological scale of this fishery is of minimal impact at the local level, the commons 
problem is more pronounced on a larger temporal scale. Even though there is a general 
perception of reliable return rates on a day-to-day basis, many fishers increasingly find it 
challenging to let their preferred fishing grounds rest two to four weeks after a harvest 
according to their local ecological knowledge and understanding about resource renewal. 
Many fishers are also concerned about new competition and the loss of fishing space due 
to mangrove destruction by shrimp farms or enclosure by other custodias, pointing to the 
ways in which the problem of the commons is also shaped by alternative cultural, 
political, and economic geographies (Beitl, 2012; Martinez-Alier, 2001; Moss, 2014).  
 
6. Conclusions 
 Decades of research on the commons and customary marine tenure institutions 
have generated much debate about whether humans are self-interested actors maximizing 
their exploitation of resources as predicted by optimal foraging theories, or whether 
conservation outcomes can emerge within the context of certain institutional 
arrangements and property regimes. This case study has illustrated that optimizing 
strategies requiring rotation among fishing grounds may be one factor contributing to 
epiphenomenal resource management. Resource user mobility in response to previous-
day catch rates and the rules of cultural institutions may be key factors mitigating against 
a tragedy of the commons in open-access areas not managed as a common property 
regime. However, the cohesion of such a flexible social structure may break down on 
larger spatial and temporal scales as “scaling up” the management of the commons has 
long been considered a challenge (Arias Schreiber & Halliday, 2013; Berkes, 2005; 
Ostrom et al., 1999).  
 On the other hand, the commons are socially constructed to embody human 
values and this case of the cockle fishery in Ecuador illustrates the highly dynamic nature 
of space, place, and territory in the commons. Custodias represent a fundamental shift in 
values that once embraced an ethos of open access. Now the tenet of proprietorship 
embodies a new way of valuing mangrove forests and ancestral community rights, with 
implications for empowerment among disenfranchised fishers. In turn, these political 
processes have influenced the nature of human-environment interactions in the cockle 
fishery by transforming the individual choices of a free-for-all into the collective choice 
agreements of the CPR. While the emergent social structures that define rules of use are 
qualitatively different, these two governance systems are complementary in the case of 
Isla Costa Rica, and neither system should replace the other. The fishers’ alternation 
between formal and informal systems of governance has allowed for adaptive feedback 
between social, economic, and ecological systems. This direct attention to social-
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ecological feedback may provide interesting insights for the management of other fishery 
commons at similar scales. However more systematic research is needed on how 
individual and collective choice decisions affect the dynamics of fishing effort allocation 
at broader spatial and temporal scales.  
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